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Abstract—Compressive sensing (CS) has become a popular
signal processing technique and has extensive applications in
numerous fields such as wireless communications, image process-
ing, magnetic resonance imaging, remote sensing imaging, and
anology to information conversion, since it can realize simul-
taneous sampling and compression. In the information security
field, secure CS has received much attention due to the fact that
CS can be regarded as a cryptosystem to attain simultaneous
sampling, compression and encryption when maintaining the
secret measurement matrix. Considering that there are increasing
works focusing on secure wireless communications based on CS
in recent years, we produce a detailed review for the state-of-
the-art in this paper. To be specific, the survey proceeds with
two phases. The first phase reviews the security aspects of CS
according to different types of random measurement matrices
such as Gaussian matrix, circulant matrix, and other special
random matrices, which establishes theoretical foundations for
applications in secure wireless communications. The second phase
reviews the applications of secure CS depending on commu-
nication scenarios such as wireless wiretap channel, wireless
sensor network, internet of things, crowdsensing, smart grid, and
wireless body area networks. Finally, some concluding remarks
are given.
Index Terms—Wireless Communications, Compressive Sens-
ing, Secure Compressive Sensing, Compressive Sensing Cryp-
tosystem
I. INTRODUCTION
Compressive sensing (CS) theory was proposed by Dono-ho, Cande`s, Tao, et al. in 2004, which is a new signal
sampling theory of being able to efficiently capture and recover
a signal through settling underdetermined linear systems [1]–
[3]. Sparsity and incoherence are two crucial conditions to
attain this purpose. On the one hand, the sparsity condition
requires the signal of interest to be sparse under some sparse
basis or have the compressibility. On the other hand, the
incoherence condition imposes a requirement for the sparse
basis and the measurement matrix. In comparison with the
traditional Shannon-Nyquist sampling theorem, CS exploits far
fewer samples to achieve the same recovery accuracy of the
signal. This is understandable, since, taking the sampling of
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electrocardiography signals for an example, an electrocardio-
graphy signal typically acquires 256 samples per second in
the traditional sampling paradigm [4]. When expressed under
appropriate basis or dictionary, such as wavelet or Gabor, most
of the coefficients will be zero and only the nonzero ones
carry information. These nonzero coefficients, rather than the
original dimension 256, control the number of measurements
to encode the signal and perform recovery. In this sense, the
CS theory is built on a workaround to directly record the
nonzero coefficients.
The CS technique has widespread applications in various
fields since its inception. In particular, in wireless communica-
tions, it is a promising technique for 5G [5], since the inherent
characteristics of CS are more suitable for the sparse channel
impulse response than the Shannon-Nyquist sampling theory.
The CS was claimed in [5] to well address the key technical
directions in 5G including increased spectral efficiency [6], [7]
and larger transmission bandwidth [8]–[11]. So far, there have
been a great number of CS-based applications in wireless com-
munications such as data gathering [12]–[16], data collection
[17], [18], data aggregation [19]–[21], data recovery [22]–[25],
spectrum sensing [26]–[31], distribution networks [32]–[36],
channel estimation [37]–[40], and other applications [41]–[48].
In a pioneer work of the fundamental CS theory [49], the
security of CS was highlighted in the sense that measurements
projected into random subspace can be viewed as a way of
information protection. A weak form of encryption offered
by a pseudorandom basis was mentioned in [50]. It has also
been discussed that the encryption matrix is involved in a
one-time pad [51]. However, for the first time, a formal
investigation of CS as a cryptosystem was stated by Rachlin
and Baron who considered the measurement matrix as a key
[52]. After a signal is sampled by a Gaussian measurement
matrix, the obtained measurements can provide the secrecy,
since the adversary has no knowledge of the measurement
matrix and cannot figure out the original signal. Though
a certain level of secrecy can be provided, the Shannon’s
perfect secrecy [53] cannot be achievable. Moreover, it was
demonstrated that when the Gaussian measurement matrix is
used, a weak secrecy notion called asymptotic perfect secrecy
can be realized [54]. Based on this notion, the perfect secrecy
can be attained by imposing more constraint on the signal to be
sampled. In [55], Bianchi et al. further proved that only the
signal energy is exposed to the adversary who observes the
measurements. This means that CS-based encryption satisfies
the perfect secrecy if the sensed signal keeps a constant
energy. In other words, normalizing the measurements before
transmission can guarantee the perfect secrecy regardless of
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However, Gaussian measurement matrix is a completely
random matrix and therefore occupies a great amount of
storage and computing resources. In consideration of this,
circulant matrix was introduced in [56], which outperforms
the Gaussian measurement matrix in terms of cost savings,
since it adopts a fast Fourier transform implementation and has
a similar reconstruction performance as the Gaussian matrix.
When circulant measurement matrix is used, security analysis
discloses that the adversary only reveals the information on
the autocorrelation of the signal.
Besides using existing measurement matrices [52], [54]–
[56] as the encryption keys, some special secret measurement
matrices have been designed [57]–[60]. The perturbation-type
measurement matrix aims at partially corrupting measurement
matrix with low-cost [57], which is applied to the scenario
that the same signal shows different levels of recovery quality
for the receivers. With the partially corrupted measurement
matrix, the quality of the recovered signal is inevitably re-
duced. Therefore, adjusting the number of corrupted entries
can optionally control the signal quality for each receiver.
This multiclass encryption possesses the asymptotic spherical
secrecy. Generally speaking, the measurement matrix needs
to be updated once to be against common attacks. For the
purpose of using a fixed measurement matrix repeatedly, a bi-
level protected CS scheme was suggested in [58], whose basic
idea is to transfer the sparsifying basis from the sensing matrix
to the measurement matrix and then set it a key. The transfer
was verified in the sense that the reconstruction performance
will not be affected. Moreover, double protection using two
matrices can resist plaintext attacks.
Fang et al. proposed parallel CS to address the problem
of data size expansion for the measurement matrix when
sampling a multi-dimensional signal and further exploited
the zig-zag permutation operation to promote the reconstruc-
tion performance of sampling two-dimensional discrete cosine
transformation signal [61]. Embedding cryptographic features
in parallel CS was discussed in [59], which demonstrated
that random permutation based encryption can make the
restricted isometry constant of parallel CS relaxed efficiently
at a high probability, i.e., enhance the quality of the recon-
structed signal. It has the asymptotic spherical secrecy as
the multiclass encryption scheme [57]. Djeujo and Ruland
ensured the secrecy by embedding some cryptographically
secure matrix transformations in structured CS [60]. These
transformations are invertible matrices and do not compromise
the reconstruction performance.
For CS applications in wireless communications, a great
number of security and privacy issues have been studied. Since
secure communication was formally proposed by Shannon
from the view point of information theory [53], many re-
search works have been emerging to guarantee secure message
sharing between communication nodes based on cryptographic
tools at the application layer [62] and ensure secure communi-
cations over wireless channels [63]. In particular, the wiretap
channel proposed by Wyner [64] is one of the classic channels
and has attracted widespread attention [65]–[67]. Secure com-
munication over wiretap channel is always a research focus
in wireless communications. A widely used system model
involves a transmitter and two receivers including a legitimate
receiver and an eavesdropper. The transmitter connects the
legitimate receiver through the main channel while connecting
the eavesdropper through the wiretap channel. The investi-
gations on the wiretap channel focus mainly on how much
information can be leaked to the eavesdropper and how the
transmission of perfect secrecy can be accomplished when the
channel is eavesdropped.
The infrastructure of CS was exploited for constructing
a secure communication channel [68]. Based on channel
asymmetry, a message is transformed into a sparse sequence,
which is not allowed to be decoded by the eavesdropper with
overwhelming probability while the legitimate receiver can
decode it with high probability. Reeves et al. proposed a
multiplicative Gaussian channel based on CS and calculated
the secrecy capacity bounds including lower bound and upper
bound [69], where the introduced security hardly affects the
capacity based on the condition that the attacker’s channel
is strictly worse than the legal user’s. The distributed CS was
used for the design of physical layer secrecy solution resulting
from the fact that it occupies less amount of channel uses and
consumes less power [70]. The reconstruction framework of
CS was utilized in the system of multiple-input multiple-output
(MIMO) precoding and postcoding to reconstruct the transmit-
ted signals [71], which can optimize the signal-to-noise ratio
(SNR) when full channel state information is available and
compensate the loss of SNR when not available. Yu considered
the circulant matrices for wireless security and demonstrated
the indistinguishability depending on the measure of relative
entropy [72]. In addition, many works based on CS were pro-
posed for different wireless communication security scenarios
such as multicarrier system [73]–[75], cooperative networks
[76], wireless sensor network (WSN) [77]–[86], internet of
things (IoT) [87]–[91], crowdsensing [92]–[94], smart grid
[95]–[97], and wireless body area networks [98]–[100].
In this survey, we make a systematic investigation for
applications of CS in secure wireless communications. In order
to better discuss the applications of CS in secure wireless
communications, we first review security aspects of CS based
on the type of measurement matrix such as Gaussian measure-
ment matrix, circulant measurement matrix, etc, which will be
potential for applications to secure wireless communication
scenarios. According to the security aspects of CS, we then
review different forms of wireless communication scenarios
including wireless wiretap channel, WSN, IoT, crowdsensing,
smart grid, and wireless body area networks. Table I gives a
overall perception for the readers and the corresponding details
are shown later. A graphical presentation of the structure of
this survey is shown in Fig. 1.
There are some existing relevant survey and tutorial papers
involving CS. A comprehensive overview in terms of CS
theories and applications was shown in [101]. Because of the
extensive applications of CS, some survey papers focusing on
application-specific scenarios have also been presented. For
example, the survey papers [102] and [103] overviewed the
applications of CS in cognitive radio communications. The
survey papers [30], [104], and [105] contain the review of
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OVERALL FRAMEWORK.
Gaussian Measurement Matrix
Circulant Measurement Matrix
Structurally Random Matrices
Security Aspects of CS Perturbation Measurement Matrix
Sparsifying Basis as a Part of the Measurement Matrix
Random Permutation as a Part of the Measurement Matrix
Multiple Random Matrices as a Part of the Measurement Matrix
CS-Based Secrecy
Secrecy Capacity
The Secrecy Based on Distributed CS
Wireless Wiretap Channel The Secrecy Based on MIMO Precoding
The Secrecy Based on Circulant Matrix
Multicarrier System
Cooperative Networks
Establishing Secure Measurement Matrix
Application Scenarios Integrity-Protected CS
Wireless Sensor Network Capturing Medical Data
Data Gathering
Compressed Detection
Adaptive CS for Smart Objects
Internet of Things Frequency Selection for Static Environment
Chaotic CS for Internet of Multimedia Things
Secure Interaction with Cloud
Crowdsensing Crowdsensing
Smart Grid Smart Grid
Wireless Body Area Networks Wireless Body Area Networks
CS applications in terms of spectrum sensing for cognitive
radio networks, machine learning for WSN, and robust carrier
tracking techniques, respectively. Nevertheless, these works
did not involve the security issues of CS. Meanwhile, a tutorial
paper [106] discussed image and video encoding modes and
wireless transmission based on CS, which apparently differs
from the present survey. The survey paper [107] involves some
privacy protection and security problems of CS, but it only
simply reviewed several kinds of CS encryption schemes and
did not consider the secure wireless communication problems
based on CS. The most similar paper to the present survey is
[108], which reviews the security aspects of CS in information
security field. However, it focuses mainly on CS-based image
security rather than wireless communications. Table II gives a
conclusive comparison for better comprehension.
This survey proceeds as follows. In Section II, the basic
theory of CS is overviewed. Section III reviews the security
aspects of CS. Section IV reviews the applications of CS in
secure wireless communication scenarios including wireless
wiretap channel, WSN, IoT, crowdsensing, smart grid, and
wireless body area networks. Some concluding remarks and
future research in this area are shown in the last section.
II. COMPRESSIVE SENSING BASICS
A signal x ∈ RN is called S-sparse if there exists a basis
B ∈ RN×N satisfying
x = Bs, (1)
where s is an N -dimensional vector with at most S nonzero
coefficients. It is called S-compressible if the S significant co-
efficients are much larger than zero and the N−S insignificant
coefficients approach to zero. The sparsity (compressibility) of
the signal ensures the exact (approximate) recovery of s (and
x since x = Bs given B and s) from linear projections
y = Ax, (2)
where A ∈ RM×N (M < N ) denotes the measurement
matrix. The recovery can be done through settling an l0
optimization problem expressed as
min ‖s‖0 s.t. y = Hs, (3)
where H = AB denotes the sensing matrix [3], [49]. How-
ever, solving this optimization problem requires an exhaustive
search over all subsets of columns of H, which is NP-hard,
as indicated in [3]. It can be further relaxed into the convex
optimization form as follows
min ‖s‖1 s.t. y = Hs. (4)
The solution of this convex problem can be identical to that of
the l0 form with overwhelming probability when H follows the
Restricted Isometry Property (RIP) [49]. The sensing matrix
H possesses the RIP of order S when the following inequality
holds [1], [2]
(1− δ) ‖v‖22 ≤ ‖Hv‖22 ≤ (1 + δ) ‖v‖22 , (5)
where v is an arbitrary sparse signal that has S nonzero
entries at most and δ ∈ (0, 1). One can define the smallest
value of δ satisfying the above inequality as the restricted
isometry constant δS . In addition, another criterion, the mutual
coherence, is also used to evaluate the performance of the
sensing matrix. It is defined as [109]
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TABLE II
COMPARISONS OF RELEVANT SURVEY & TUTORIAL PAPERS INVOLVING CS.
Paper Type Scope and Contributions Difference with The Proposed Survey
Review Paper [101] Theories and applications of CS Not involve security aspects of CS
Survey Paper [102] Applications of CS in cognitive radio communications Not involve security aspects of CS
Survey Paper [103] Applications of CS in cognitive radio communications Not involve security aspects of CS
Survey Paper [30] Applications of CS in cognitive radio networks Not involve security aspects of CS
Survey Paper [104] Applications of CS in machine learning for WSN Not involve security aspects of CS
Survey Paper [105] Applications of CS in robust carrier tracking techniques Not involve security aspects of CS
Tutorial Paper [106] CS-based multimedia encoding and wireless transmission Not consider secure wireless communication problems based on CS
Survey Paper [107] Several kinds of CS encryption schemes Not consider secure wireless communication problems based on CS
Review Paper [108] Image security based on CS Not consider secure wireless communication problems based on CS
µ (H) = max
1<i6=j<N
∣∣hTi hj∣∣
‖hi‖2‖hj‖2
, (6)
where hi represents the ith column of H. It was demonstrated
that there exists at most an S-sparse signal s satisfying
y = Hs provided that µ (H) < 1/(2S − 1) for any y [109].
So far, there have been a number of algorithms used for
the reconstruction such as orthogonal matching pursuit [110],
gradient projection [111], and nonconvex minimization [112].
III. SECURITY ASPECTS OF COMPRESSIVE SENSING
Compressive sensing can be regarded as a symmetric-
key cryptosystem when the measurement matrix acts a key,
as shown in Fig. 2, in which E (·) and D (·) represent
the encryption and decryption functions, respectively. The
cryptosystem contains five objectives, i.e., input signal x as
plaintext, measurement matrix A as key, sampled result y as
ciphertext, measurement process in (2) as encryption function
E (·), and reconstruction process in (4) as decryption function
D (·). Let X and Y be the sets of plaintexts and ciphertexts,
respectively, and K be the key set. Alice encrypts the plaintext
x ∈ X with the encryption function EK (·) : X → Y and
the measurement matrix A ∈ K shared between Alice and
Bob, and the corresponding ciphertext y ∈ Y is sent to
Bob over insecure channel in which an evil attacker called
Eve tries to intercept message y. Upon receiving y, Bob
decrypts it with the decryption function DK (·) : Y → X
and A to obtain the original x. Note that, the y that Bob
receives may have a tiny change due to the channel noise.
Moreover, the recovered x may be a little different from
the exact x, since it is often an approximate version after
being recovered by some reconstruction algorithms. Therefore,
we have DA (y) = DA (E (x)) = x while neglecting the
subtle influence of the channel noise and the reconstruction
operation. This basic CS cryptosystem is marked as CSC for
short hereinafter.
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Note that, in comparison with the general symmetric-key
cipher that is not based on CS, the CSC has the extra advantage
of compression capacity. The compression capacity also brings
a new issue that the decrypted result is often an approximated
version of the original plaintext to facilitate the computation,
although the original plaintext can be exactly obtained without
loss of information in theory. Another difference between them
is that the CSC is not suitable for multiple rounds of encryption
for security enhancement, since, after one-time sampling, the
measurements tend to be random and would not possess the
sparsity. The design of CSC focuses mainly on the security
guarantee while taking CS for signal sampling. As a result,
the CSC cannot be applied to universal encryption.
As mentioned above, the reason that CS can be regarded
as a cryptosystem depends mainly on treating the measure-
ment matrix as a key. Thus, we want to investigate which
measurement matrices actually play the keys of the CSC,
what properties these CSC systems possess, and what level
of secrecy they have. To play a role of key, the measurement
matrix should have the property of “randomness”; otherwise,
it cannot provide the secrecy. Fox example, the deterministic
measurement matrices apparently cannot offer any kind of
secrecy. Correspondingly, we turn to random measurement
matrices including Gaussian matrix, circulant matrix, and other
special random matrices, which can be potentially applied in
secure wireless communications. In this section, we review the
security aspects of CS from two sides. On one hand, various
random measurement matrices are investigated in Subsections
A-F. On the other hand, some security analyses are discussed
in the last two subsections.
A. Gaussian Measurement Matrix
Gaussian matrix consisting of independent and identically
distributed (i.i.d.) Gaussian random variables was considered
as a key in CSC for the first time [49] and we denote it as
Gaussian-CSC. Which level of secrecy the Gaussian-CSC can
achieve will be elaborated in the followings. Shannon, the
founder of information theory, pioneered the prefect secrecy
from a statistical sense when considering an eavesdropper with
unbounded computation [53].
Definition 1. Perfect Secrecy. A cryptosystem is said to have
a perfect secrecy if for any plaintext x and corresponding
ciphertext y,
p (x|y) = p (x) . (7)
The above formula means that a plaintext’s posterior probabil-
ity conditioned on the ciphertext equals its priori probability.
Alternatively, it is interpreted as I (x; y) = 0 from the
information theory perspective, in which I (x; y) represents the
mutual information of plaintext and ciphertext [113]. More-
over, the above formula can be also equivalently interpreted
as p (y|x) = p (y) by using Bayes’ theorem.
The Gaussian-CSC in terms of perfect secrecy was first
investigated in [52], where the adversary, Eve, is assumed to
lunch a ciphertext-only attack (COA) through leveraging y,
the sparsity of x, and K to recover x. The key is defaulted to
one-time, meaning that each A is used only once.
Theorem 1. Gaussian-CSC is not perfectly secure.
It was proved in Lemma 1 in [52]. In fact, due to the
RIP property of Gaussian measurement matrix, the energy
of ciphertext reveals energy information of the plaintext, thus
violating the definition of perfect secrecy. It was demonstrated
in [55] that after sampling using an i.i.d. Gaussian matrix
consisting of Gaussian variables with zero mean as a key, the
generated random linear measurements intercepted by Eve will
not reveal anything about the plaintext other than its energy.
Theorem 2. Gaussian-CSC yields
p (y|x) = p (y|εx) . (8)
The above equation is equivalent to I (x; y) = I (εx; y)
[55], where εx is used for characterizing the energy of the
plaintext, i.e., εx = ‖x‖22. This result says that Eve only infers
the knowledge of εx, which holds regardless of the sparse
degree of x. According to this theorem, the prefect secrecy of
Gaussian-CSC is achievable under some assumptions.
Theorem 3. Gaussian-CSC is said to be perfectly secure while
εx keeps a constant.
εx keeping a constant indicates the energy of the signal
maintains unchanged, thus Eve cannot dig out any information
6from the ciphertext. In general, the assumption of the constant
energy signal is far-fetched and then we can exert some
processing on the ciphertext to easily deduce another prefect
secrecy.
Theorem 4. Gaussian-CSC is said to be perfectly secure when
transmitting the normalized ciphertext
ynorm = y/εy, (9)
where εy = ‖y‖22 represents the energy of the ciphertext.
Apparently, after the normalization, the energy of the plaintext
is hided such that Eve is not able to know εx any more. Now
that y results in the energy of x if not normalized, it is required
to be aware of how much information is exactly leaked through
observing y. Bianchi et al. quantified this kind of information
leakage using the mean square error and gave some useful
bounds and estimators for the generic signals, and the relevant
details are referred to [55].
B. Circulant Measurement Matrix
Circulant matrix is also capable of offering the randomness,
which has lower complexity in contrast to Gaussian matrix
when generated, transmitted and used for measuring the signal
[114]. It consists of a sequence of i.i.d. Gaussian or sub-
Gaussian variables expressed as
A =

a1 a2 · · · aN
aN a1 · · · aN−1
aN−1 aN · · · aN−2
...
...
. . .
...
aN−M+2 aN−M+3 · · · aN−M+1

M×N
,
(10)
where the N -dimensional row vector a = [ai], i =
1, 2, · · · , N , spanning the whole matrix A. It was demon-
strated that this kind of matrix, when acting as a measurement
matrix used for measuring and reconstruction, has similar
performance as the full Gaussian matrix [114]. Thus, it can
act as an alternative for reducing the complexity. Interestingly,
it can be quickly realized using a fast Fourier transform by
A = ∆FHΛF, (11)
in which F stands for the unitary discrete Fourier transform
(DFT) matrix, FH is the Hermitian transpose of F, Λ rep-
resents a diagonal matrix in which diagonal entries are the
values generated by the DFT of a, and ∆ is a subsampling
operator of randomly extracting M entries from N ones.
The secrecy of circulant matrix as a key was inspected in
[56], which introduces a generic permutation matrix P that
has only one “1” in both each row and each column before
measuring. In other words, the measurement matrix is changed
into
A = ∆FHΛFP. (12)
The corresponding cryptosystem is denoted as Circulant-
CSC. Let Cv stand for the circular autocorrelation matrix of
vector v, i.e.,[
Cvi,j
]
=
∑N
l=1
vlv(l+i−j) mod N , i, j = 1, 2, · · · , N, (13)
where mod is the modulo operator. Maintaining ∆ and P
public, one has the following result.
Theorem 5. Circulant-CSC only leaks CPx.
Here, leak refers to the fact that the eavesdropper could
only learn CPx in theory when observing the ciphertext. In
fact, it was proved that Circulant-CSC satisfies p (y|x) =
p
(
y|∆CPx∆T ) [56], meaning that Eve only reveals some
entries of the circular autocorrelation matrix of vector Px.
Which entries are revealed depends on the subsampling op-
erator ∆. The detailed analysis of the autocorrelation of the
plaintext can be found in [56].
C. Structurally Random Matrices
A kind of fast and efficient structurally random matrices was
designed for the measurement matrix [115], which is generated
by multiplying three matrices as follows:
A =
√
N/M∆F′R, (14)
where R ∈ RN×N can be a diagonal matrix in which
diagonal entries can be i.i.d. Bernoulli variables. R can also
be a permutation matrix. It focuses on scrambling the signal’s
sample locations globally or flipping the signals sample signs
locally, respectively. F′ ∈ RN×N is an orthonormal matrix
such as Walsh-Hadamard Transform (WHT) and discrete
cosine transform (DCT). ∆ ∈ RM×N is operator used for
subsampling. The purpose of
√
N/M is to balance the energy
of the measurement vector and that of the input signal by
normalizing the transform. In this measurement matrix, ∆ and
R are random matrices, which can be set as the secret keys.
From the viewpoint of the reconstruction performance, it has
theoretical sensing performance as that of Gaussian measure-
ment matrix but lower complexity due to fast computation
transform, supporting block-based processing, and friendly
hardware implementation. Thus, ∆ and R maintaining as
the keys can make this kind of structurally random matrices
suitable for privacy-preserving, large-scale, and real-time sig-
nal acquisition applications. Apparently, it cannot attain the
perfect secrecy but more stronger secrecy if normalizing the
ciphertext.
D. Perturbation Measurement Matrix
Perturbation-type measurement matrix was presented in
[57], which is used for building scalable encryption methods.
Assume that two receivers have the same ciphertext y but
different decoding matrices, then they yield different quality of
plaintexts after decryption. In order to build different decoding
matrices, the initial measurement matrix A(0) is a Bernoulli
random matrix and then perturbed by flipping the sign of some
entries in a random pattern as the following formula:
A
(1)
i,j =
{
A
(0)
i,j , (i, j) /∈ Γ(0)
−A(0)i,j , (i, j) ∈ Γ(0)
, (15)
where Γ(0) denotes a subset consisting of index pairs of the
perturbed entries. Let
∣∣Γ(0)∣∣ represent the number of entries in
7Γ(0), then the relation between A(0) and A(1) is determined
by a
∣∣Γ(0)∣∣-sparse random perturbation matrix A(∆)
A(1) = A(0) + A(∆), (16)
where
A
(∆)
(i,j) =
{
0, (i, j) /∈ Γ(0)
−2A(0)i,j , (i, j) ∈ Γ(0)
. (17)
When the sampling mode is y = A(1)x = A(0)x+A(∆)x,
the receiver with the knowledge of A(1) could exactly recon-
struct the sparse solution while the receiver only knowing A(0)
is only able to reconstruct a noisy version of x due to the term
A(∆)x. Based on this kind of two-class perturbation mode,
the authors in [57] also suggested an improved version for
multiple receivers and the corresponding performance bounds
about the recovery quality are theoretically analysed. Although
not perfectly secure, it can attain a notion called asymptotic
spherical secrecy at almost zero cost.
Definition 2. Asymptotic spherical secrecy [57]. Assume that
X and Y are random processes, which correspond to plain-
texts and ciphertexts, respectively. The plaintexts have bounded
energy ε¯x = lim
N→∞
1
N
∑N
j=1 x
2
j . A encryption scheme satisfies
asymptotic spherical secrecy provided that for any plaintext
x, ciphertext y, the following formula holds
fY |X (y |x )→
D
fY |ε¯x (y) , (18)
in which →
D
denotes the distribution convergence.
Theorem 6. The CSC with perturbation measurement matrix
has the asymptotic spherical secrecy [57].
It indicates that only the energy of plaintext will be leaked,
which, in fact, is similar to the above Theorems 2-4. They
characterize the almost same meaning.
Generally speaking, known-plaintext attack possesses more
threat than ciphertext-only attack, since Eve can leverage
some pairs of plaintext and ciphertext rather than solely the
ciphertext. Cambareri et al. performed a quantitative analysis
for the CSC of perturbation measurement matrix as a key
against a special form of known-plaintext attack [116], in
which the problem of attacking the key is transformed into
a subset-sum problem [117] and how much Eve can reveal
the measurement is quantitatively investigated.
Definition 3. Let u be a positive integer vector of size N and
v be a positive integer. The subset-sum problem is to assign a
binary vector b of size N such that
v =
∑N
l=1
blul, (19)
where b is referred to as the solution.
Consider the CSC of perturbation measurement matrix, the
sampling method is expressed as y = A(1)x, then Eve
attempts to reveal A(1)j with a set of antipodal symbols Aˆ
(1)
j
such that y = Aˆ(1)j x.
Theorem 7. The known-plaintext attack to A(1) is equiv-
alent to the subset-sum problem, where ul = |xl|, bl =
1
2
(
sign (xl) Aˆ
(1)
j,l + 1
)
, and v = 12
(
yj +
∑N
l=1 |xl|
)
.
Based on the above theorem, a solution b¯ in the subset-sum
problem corresponds to the row A(1)j while the remaining
candidate solutions correspond to the rows Aˆ(1)j 6= A(1)j .
Therefore, when Eve performs an attack to A(1), the expected
number of finding out rows in A(1) can be estimated by using
the expected number of solutions as follows.
Theorem 8. The expected number of candidate solutions for
large N , asymptotically equals 2
N
L
√
3
piN , in which all the
coefficients ul from {1, 2, · · · , L} are i.i.d. and uniform, and
the true solution b¯ yields equiprobable and independent binary
values.
In addition, for the recovery performance of this kind of CSC,
a detailed analysis can be referred to [118].
E. Sparsifying Basis as a Part of the Measurement Matrix
In general, the measurement matrix needs to be updated
once to ensure the security of CSC, since the attacker can
launch a plaintext attack to reveal the measurement matrix
by possibly contrasting several plaintext and ciphertext pairs.
However, a key reuse circumstance of utilizing a fixed mea-
surement matrix with multiple times was devised in [58].
Except the secret protection of the measurement matrix, a
secret sparsifying basis B can be added in the signal sampling,
thus it becomes a bi-level protection sampling model:
y = A′x = AB−1x, (20)
in which A′ = AB−1 is the new measurement matrix.
However, with respect to the RIP property of this new mea-
surement matrix, it may not stand up any more, thus possibly
leading to an incorrect reconstruction. Interestingly, Zhang
et al. demonstrated an efficient reconstruction in virtue of
RIPless theory [119]. It is mainly because given a secret basis
B, the new sensing matrix used for reconstruction becomes
H′ = A′B = AB−1B = A, which is exactly the original
measurement matrix. That is to say, the sensing matrix still
follows the RIP theory. For an attacker, only revealing A′
through launching plaintext attacks is far from enough, since
B is still unknown and then A is also unknown. In fact, the
difficulty of attacking lies in how to decompose A′ into A and
B. It is verified that this bi-level protection sampling model
supports reusing the measurement matrix and can thwart
plaintext attacks.
F. Random Permutation as a Part of the Measurement Matrix
The permutation technique has been found to be able to
relax the RIP requirement in parallel CS theory [61]. In other
words, prior to sampling, the 2D sparse signal is possibly
permuted to make each sub-signal have almost equal number
of nonzero entries, therefore the recovery performance can
be improved. Fang et al. suggested that zig-zag permutation
can makes the RIP efficiently relaxed at a high probability
in parallel CS [61]. Different from the general permutation
technique, random permutation is a common technique widely
used in cryptography and is considered to be embedded in CSC
in [59], where random permutation is demonstrated to be an
8efficient RIP relaxation technique. Let P (·) denote a random
permutation matrix or a random permutation operation, then
the sampling method is represented as
y = A · P (x) . (21)
The new measurement matrix can be regarded as A′ =
A · P (·). If P (·) is a matrix, A′ will be a matrix. If P (·)
is an operation, A′ will also be a measurement operation. As
the case of sparsifying basis as a part of the measurement
matrix, random permutation as a part of the measurement
matrix possesses double layer protection mechanism thanks
to P (·) acting as a new key. Nevertheless, the former can be
against plaintext attacks but the latter does not necessarily.
Theorem 9. The CSC with random permutation as a part of
the measurement matrix has the asymptotic spherical secrecy
[59].
G. Multiple Random Matrices as a Part of the Measurement
Matrix
Besides random permutation matrix playing a part of the
measurement matrix, some other matrices can also be embed-
ded in the measurement matrix. Djeujo and Ruland came up
with the following matrix transform [60]:
T (A) = RpRrPrAPcRc, (22)
where Rp is an M ×M binary matrix, which is generated by
doing p times the operation of adding one row of an identity
matrix to another. Rr and Rc are diagonal matrices, whose
sizes are M ×M and N × N , respectively. Pr and Pc are
random permutation matrices with single “1” per row and
column, whose sizes are M ×M and N × N , respectively.
With this new measurement matrix, the sampling scheme is
y = A′ = T (A) x = RpRrPrAPcRcx. (23)
It can be easily proved that the newly added five random
matrices can maintain the invariance of RIP for the new
measurement matrix. They shall be secretly altered for each
signal sampling to be against plaintext attacks.
A summary result is shown in Table III. We can find a CSC
scheme does not attain the perfect secrecy in general, which
can be easily understood due to the linearity of the encryption
algorithm. A CSC scheme must leak the information more
or less, for example, for the cases of Gaussian measurement
matrix, circulant measurement matrix, and structurally random
matrices. In other terms, in order for reaching the perfect
secrecy, some additional conditions need to be appended.
The asymptotic spherical secrecy is an ad hoc definition for
the CSC and a CSC scheme satisfying this definition can
be thought as an excellent cryptosystem like the cases of
perturbation measurement matrix and random permutation as
a part of the measurement matrix. For the cases of sparsifying
basis as a part of the measurement matrix and multiple random
matrices as a part of the measurement matrix, being able
to resist plaintext attacks will make themselves have wider
applications than other CSC schemes.
H. General Security Analysis
For the general random measurement matrices such as
Gaussian and Bernoulii matrices, whose corresponding CSC is
marked as General-CSC, the security analysis is evaluated by
Hossein et al. [54], in which the mutual information between
plaintext and ciphertext is analysed with regard to whether the
distribution of the plaintext is known. Let χ denote a discrete
source alphabet set.
Theorem 10. I (x; y) = log (|χ|)/|χ| if the plaintext yields a
uniform distribution for alphabet set χ in a CSC system.
It can be observed from the above result of the mutual
information that the perfect secrecy is unachievable, but the
asymptotically perfect secrecy is accessible when the number
|χ| tends to the infinity in a countable domain. This kind of
secrecy is referred to as Maurer-sense perfect secrecy [120],
which apparently is not stronger than the perfect secrecy.
Definition 4. A cryptosystem is said to have a Maurer-sense
perfect secrecy if lim
N→∞
I (X,Y ) = 0, in which X and Y
respectively correspond to plaintext and ciphertext sets and
N represents the number of plaintexts generated from χ.
The case of the uniform distribution is generalized into that of
the unknown distribution [54], and the mutual information is
shown in the following theorem. In other words, Eve is able to
reveal the mutual information based on ciphertext-only attack.
Theorem 11. When the statistical distribution of the plaintext
set is unknown in a CSC system, we have the following result
I (x; y) =
1− fX(0)2 + I1 (x; y)
2M ln 2
, (24)
where fX (x) represents the density function of plaintexts and
I1 (x; y) follows a gamma distribution approximately.
In the above security analyses, the key is assumed to be
without any privacy leakage. Nevertheless, it was claimed that
for sparse plaintext, the key may be partly retrieved by use
of the prior sparsity knowledge of the plaintext and thus the
security analysis is further exploited from two newly defined
criteria including the extended Shannon-sense perfect secre-
cy (ESSPS) and the extended Wyner-sense perfect secrecy
(EWSPS) [121].
Definition 5. A cryptosystem is said to have ESSPS if
I (X ′;Y ′) + I (K ′;Y ′) = 0, (25)
in which X ′ represents plaintext, Y ′ represents ciphertext, and
K ′ represents key.
Definition 6. A cryptosystem is said to have EWSPS if
lim
N ′→∞
I (X ′;Y ′) + I (K ′;Y ′)
N ′
= 0, (26)
in which N ′ represents the plaintext length.
Theorem 12. The General-CSC cannot achieve ESSPS when
changing the measurement matrix for each sampling.
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THE LEVEL OF SECRECY FOR DIFFERENT TYPES OF CSCS FROM VIEW OF KEY.
The Type of CSC The Level of Secrecy
Gaussian measurement matrix [49], [52], [55] Have perfect secrecy under the condition of normalizing the ciphertext
Circulant measurement matrix [56] Leak some information of the autocorrelation of the plaintext
Structurally random matrices [115] Not having perfect secrecy
Perturbation measurement matrix [57] Have asymptotic spherical secrecy
Sparsifying basis as a part of the measurement matrix [58] Not have perfect secrecy but being against plaintext attacks
Random permutation as a part of the measurement matrix [59] Have asymptotic spherical secrecy
Multiple random matrices as a part of the measurement matrix [60] Not have perfect secrecy but being against plaintext attacks
Theorem 13. The General-CSC can achieve EWSPS when
changing the measurement matrix for each sampling.
Theorem 14. The General-CSC cannot achieve EWSPS when
utilizing the measurement matrix for multiple samplings.
Theorem 15. Eve can partly assess the measurement matrix
and the plaintext with probability 1 with the increase of
repeated times of utilizing the same measurement matrix, if
the plaintexts are mutually independent.
The above theorem indicates the General-CSC is not immune
against plaintext attacks, as shown in the next section.
I. Security Enhancement
1) Counter Mode: Chosen-plaintext attack is able to arbi-
trarily select plaintexts and obtain the corresponding cipher-
text. Therefore, if a cryptosystem is secure against chosen-
plaintext attack, it also resists known-plaintext attack and
ciphertext-only attack. For a CSC, the linearity of the sampling
structure determines the difficult of being against chosen-
plaintext attack. Fay introduced the counter mode [122] in the
CSC for the sake of resisting chosen-plaintext attack [123]. A
series of plaintexts xi, i = 1, 2, . . . , l, is encrypted as follows
yi = Aixi, (27)
where Ai is a Bernoulli random matrix. Let Aij be the j-th
row vector of Ai, where j represents the positive integer no
larger than M , then
Ai =
((
Ai1
)T
,
(
Ai2
)T
, · · · , (AiM)T)T , (28)
where Aij is generated by using a keyed hash function with the
input ctri and j. The counter mode requires an initialization
vector IV , and ctri is calculated as
ctri+1 = (ctri + 1) mod 2
n, ctr1 = IV. (29)
The decryption process is described as
xˆi = Rec
(
yi,Ai
)
, (30)
where Rec (·) represents a reconstruction algorithm. The intro-
duced counter mode in the CSC that is secure against chosen-
plaintext attack means that one key can be used to encrypt
multiple messages. In addition, an advantage of this mode is
the parallelizability, i.e., the sampling and reconstruction can
be implemented in parallel.
2) Two New Modes of Operation: Fay and Ruland further
improved the CSC with the counter mode [123] by developing
modes of operation to encrypt multiple plaintexts with differ-
ent energy while not leaking the signal energy to Eve [124].
As indicated in [55], [57], the signal energy can be normalized
prior to transmission to achieve ciphertext indistinguishability
or asymptotic ciphertext indistinguishability, i.e., the encryp-
tion algorithm is
y¯i =
1
εxi
Aixi, (31)
where the signal energy εxi = ‖xi‖22. For the purpose of
learning about the signal energy, a separate sensor needs
to be loaded in the sensing system. Yet, it gives rise to
a problem of how to secretly delivery the signal energy
used for Bob’s decryption. The authors in [124] decorated
two encryption modes for the signal energy including the
counter mode and the cipher block chaining [125]. Both two
modes have different properties and applications. The former
allows precomputation of matrices and parallel processing,
thus being able to offer high performance while the latter is
self-synchronizing, suitable for some connection-less protocols
where the ciphertext order is allowed to be changed to some
extent.
IV. SECURE WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS BASED ON CS
Based on the secret measurement matrices, Alice can secret-
ly sample the signal of interest and then transmit the sampled
measurements over some wireless communication channels to
Bob. Moreover, the CS framework can be applied to some
channels to bring benefits. Different forms of channel charac-
teristics in wireless communications imply different scenarios
of CSC, which are discussed in the following subsections in
detail in terms of wireless wiretap channel, wireless sensor
network, internet of things, crowdsensing, smart grid, and
wireless body area networks, as graphically shown in Fig. 3.
A. Wireless Wiretap Channel
In the wireless wiretap channel, Eve as an eavesdropper
intercepts the message over a wiretap channel except a main
channel between Alice and Bob.
1) CS-Based Secrecy: Based on the CS framework, Agraw-
al and Vishwanath built up a secure communication way over
a wiretap physical layer channel by leveraging the channel
asymmetry [68]. The channel model, as depicted in Fig. 4, is
as follows {
yBob = JBobAx + eBob
yEve = JEveAx + eEve
, (32)
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Fig. 3. Various scenarios of secure wireless communications based on CS.
in which x represents an N × 1 vector to be transmitted,
and yBob and yEve are the output vectors that are transmitted
over Bob’s channel JBob and Eve’s channel JEve, respectively.
eBob and eEve are the Gaussian noise vectors with zero-mean
and variance σ2. The precoding Ax is the framework of
CS, which encodes the original message into low-dimensional
measurements. Analyses pointed out that Bob can exploit
accurate recovery and Eve only obtains an infeasible recovery.
2) Secrecy Capacity: With respect to a multiplicative Gaus-
sian wiretap channel based on CS, the secrecy capacity was
quantitatively studied in [69]. The channel model is described
as {
yBob = JBobAx
yEve = JEveAx
, (33)
where x is assumed to be the input binary vector with length
N , and JBob and JEve are fixed and known to all parties, whose
lengths are NBob and NEve, respectively, satisfying 0 ≤ NEve <
NBob < N/2. The secrecy capacity bounds are reflected as the
following two theorems.
Theorem 16. The lower bound is
1
N
logN ′ − 1
2N
log J ′ +
∑
x
1
2NN ′
log J ′′,
where N ′ =
(
N
NBob − 1
)
, J ′ = det
(
1
N JEveJ
T
Eve
)
, J ′′ =
det
(
1
N ′Bob
JEve (x) JEve(x)
T
)
, and x is from the set of all
binary vectors with NBob − 1 ones.
Theorem 17. The upper bound is
1
N
max
(
logN ′, max
NBob≤j≤N
(c˜1 (i)− c˜2 (j))
)
+
logN
N
,
where c˜1 (i) = max
1≤i≤N
NBob
2 log
(
1
NBob
‖JBob (i)‖2
)
and c˜2 (j) =
max
x
1
2 log
(
det
(
1
jJBob (x) JBob(x)
T
))
, x is from the set of
all binary vectors with j ones.
Following the secrecy capacity bounds, the expectation of
the secrecy capacity and the asymptotic secrecy capacity are
further analysed in [69].
3) The Secrecy Based on Distributed CS: Different from
the CS-based physical layer secrecy schemes that involve only
a point-to-point communication [68], [69], an amplify and
forward scheme based on distributed CS was proposed to well
cater the distributed nature of WSN [126]. It offers the physical
layer secrecy underlying the distributed scheme [127] that
can consume less power and occupy less amount of channel
uses. For offering the physical layer secrecy, the measurement
matrix as the channel matrix is used to encode the signal
and Eve cannot reveal the true signal without its information.
This scheme was demonstrated to be able to attain the perfect
secrecy when facing a group of coordinated eavesdroppers. It
is worth noting that this scheme has the advantage of key-
based secrecy [52] as well as keyless-based physical layer
secrecy [68], [69].
4) The Secrecy Based on MIMO Precoding: The secrecy
capacity can be maximized provided that the information of
full channel state of Bob and Eve can be acquired [128]. How-
ever, some applications make it impractical that a transmitter
knows the information of channel state of Eve. Aiming at the
transmitter with the knowledge of only the channel state infor-
mation, Lin et al. put forward a secure transmission paradigm
based on an MIMO technique [71], which can simultaneously
maximize the secrecy and SNR. The CS technique can be
embedded in the proposed paradigm and makes it become an
underdetermined linear system, therefore some CS reconstruc-
tion algorithms can be directly used to recover the transmitted
signals. If only knowing partial information of channel state,
the transmitter could exploit a new Lloyd algorithm to quantize
the precoder based on the newly constructed codebooks while
not cutting down the secrecy. Even if the full information is
unknown, a low-cost postcoder can still be adopted to make
up for the loss of SNR. To sum up, the full recovery rate and
the perfect secrecy are both achievable. In addition, for the
general channel coding problem of CS in the wiretap channel,
some relevant results can be found in [129].
5) The Secrecy Based on Circulant Matrix: As previously
mentioned, the CSC with circulant matrix as a key leaks only
the autocorrelation of the plaintext [114]. Likewise, this CSC
based on circulant matrix can ensure wireless indistinguisha-
bility security when maintaining the plaintext-to-noise ratio of
Eve and the low channel gains for a short ciphertext and a
long keystream [72]. The security measure is conducted by
the relative entropy [113].
Definition 7. The relative entropy is described as the total
variation distance of two cases p (y|x1), p (y|x2), where y is
from one of two plaintexts x1 and x2.
Theorem 18. For the CSC with the circulant matrix in (11)
and the channel model (32), the relative entropy is bounded
by
M
2
(
ηνεx
Vnoise
√
N
− log
(
ηνεx
Vnoise
√
N
+ 1
))
with probability 1 − ν, where for the noise, its variance is
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Fig. 4. Wiretap channel mode based on CS.
represented by Vnoise, εxVnoiseM represents the plaintext-to-noise
ratio, and ην , which has an directly proportional relationship
with the channel gains, is a constant related to ν.
From this theorem, it can be found that with the growth of
the keystream length N and the ciphertext length M , and the
decrease of channel gain and the plaintext-to-noise ratio, the
relative entropy becomes smaller and then the indistinguisha-
bility becomes stronger.
6) Multicarrier System: For a multicarrier system [130],
CS was considered to provide secret communication [73], in
which, to enhance the difficult of Eve’s attack, the transmitter
can transmit artificial noise and a sparse signal over the
frequency domain. Meanwhile, the channel state information
can be exploited to selectively transmit artificial noise to
reduce its impact on Bob. The specific way is to partition
subcarriers into two subsets, which are separately used for
secure transmission from Alice to Bob and artificial noise
transmission to degrade Eve’s channel. Due to the impact
of noise, it is difficult for Eve to get the knowledge of the
received signals and estimate the measurement matrix, thus
not being able to recover the original sparse signal. Finally,
an upper bound on Eve’s successful probability was derived.
Besides of adding the artificial noise to increase the secret rate
[130], a channel-aware randomization approach is induced in
the encryption process to provide the secrecy against Eve while
a feasible recovery at Bob [74]. In comparison with [130],
both the secret signal and the original signal have the same
statistical properties, and the probability of successful attack
rather than the secret rate is the performance measure, as the
perfect secrecy is not achievable.
Cho and Yu studied a particular measurement matrix for
secure communication in the multicarrier system [75]. The
measurement matrix is given as
A=
1√
MN
RBerF, (34)
where RBer is a random Bernoulli matrix and F represents the
DFT matrix. The number field is complex-valued. With this
measurement matrix and a constraint on plaintexts, each cor-
responding ciphertext is represented by a circularly symmet-
ric complex Gaussian random vector when transmitted over
spectral domain of multicarrier communications. To further
figure out the energy sensitivity and indistinguishability, two
distance measure tools including total variation and Hellinger
distance are adopted to examine the probability distributions
of ciphertexts. This cryptosystem was verified to have the
indistinguishability against Eve’s attack when keeping the
plaintext a constant energy, which is a similar to the result
of [55].
7) Cooperative Networks: Along with the amplify and
forward CS scheme [126], a secure commmunication scheme
based on CS and energy harvesting was designed for coopera-
tive networks [76]. The superiority of energy harvesting lies in
its capability of transferring energy from sources and relays,
thus the relays can exploit energy harvesting on the received
signals from sources by use of the power splitting relaying
protocol and then the harvested energy can help to amplify
the information and then forward it to the destination. The
analyses showed that the secrecy capacity of this scheme is
high enough.
B. Wireless Sensor Network
The CS can perform simultaneous sampling and com-
pression with low complexity and has a wide application
in resource-limited WSN. Embedding the security into the
process of CS can bring simultaneous sampling, compression,
and encryption without affecting the CS performance.
1) Establishing Secure Measurement Matrix: Dautov and
Tsouri constructed a secure measurement matrix for wireless
security [77]. To generate this matrix, the received signal
strength indicator values are performed by the reciprocal quan-
tization and then utilized for secret bit extraction and these bits
are considered as the initial seeds of a linear feedback shift
register. Iterating this register forms the final measurement
matrix. This matrix was evaluated in the Rician fading model
[131], which can ensure the physical layer security. Similar
to [77], a lightweight encryption scheme was reported [78],
in which the information of channel measurements controls
the generation of the measurement matrix and thus no key
distribution agreement exists.
2) Integrity-Protected CS: Instead of establishing a secure
measurement matrix [77], the advanced encryption standard
(AES) affords the encryption on the measurements after CS
and meanwhile, a hash algorithm is added over transmission
channel for integrity checking [79]. The proposed architecture
was evaluated by a hardware implementation platform, where
a 65-nm CMOS technology is employed for realizing the CS,
AES, and integrity checking algorithms. The evaluation results
showed that this architecture is energy-efficient and highly
secure.
3) Capturing Medical Data: Aiming at medical WSN, Oth-
man et al. presented a secure data transmission scheme [80],
which has a resemblance with [79], i.e., the data are captured
and then encrypted rather than embedding the security into the
CS process. It consists of the medical data samples based on
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CS, XOR encryption, patient’s personal aggregator, and room
controller’s aggregator. Note that, the scheme differs from the
CS-based aggregation schemes [19], [20], [104], [132], since
the CS and aggregation are separate procedures in the present
scheme.
4) Data Gathering: The CS is an efficient technique of
data gathering in WSN [133]–[137]. This is due to the fact
that each node can send multiple projected results rather than
only a message to the sink with the help of the CS and
it can obtain a high-quality result recovered from a handful
of received messages [138]–[140]. Nevertheless, the privacy
is overlooked, since the environment used for deploying the
sensor nodes is often open and the sensing data are very
likely sensitive. A privacy-protected version for CS-based data
gathering with the help of two cryptographic schemes was
suggested in [81]. One cryptographic scheme is to integrate
pseudorandom permutations and symmetric encryption, and
the other one is based on pseudorandom permutations and
additively homomorphic encryption. The first one relies on
the nature of CS to some extent without introducing much
computational complexity while the additively homomorphic
encryption consumes too much computation overhead in the
second one. In contrast to the first one, however, the second
one does not worry about a more malicious Eve, as it has a
strict cryptography guarantee.
Two statistical inference attacks [82] were analysed for the
general CS data gathering framework. The analysis showed
that the information leakage can be easy and highly probable
with only a sensor compromised by Eve who could reveal the
sensor readings effectively. The leakage error is quantitatively
estimated through extensive statistical analyses. According to
these analyses, the authors in [82] came up with a secure
scheme to prevent the inference attacks. To increase the
security, chaos system was considered to be applied to CS
data gathering framework [83], in which the security and
performance of the multimedia data gathering were promoted
by a block encryption mode and a message authentication
code based on a chaotic system. While one can exert the
security protection on the measurements for each sensor, it is
not treated as a privacy-preserving version due to no security
guarantee during the CS process. For this purpose, Xie et
al. brought forth such a compressive data gathering scheme
based on homomorphic cryptosystem [84]. The homomorphic
encryption benefits the intermediate sensor nodes recode the
message over encrypted domain without the knowledge of the
decryption key and thereby the privacy does not leak.
C. Internet of Things
The IoT is becoming increasingly popular now and the
existing privacy issues in it are also non-negligible [141]–
[144]. The CS can be a candidate tool for IoT security [145],
[146].
1) Adaptive CS for Smart Objects: Smart objects are
the fundamental blocks in IoT system and are resource-
constrained, and the adaptive CS can offer lightweight com-
Fig. 5. The number of publications.
pression and encryption [87]. The framework is simply for-
mulated by
minM s.t. erecon<ethre, (35)
for a given quality-of-service. M represents the number of
packets after CS sampling. erecon, ethre represent the recon-
struction error and corresponding threshold error, respectively.
The above expression means to find out the optimal compres-
sion performance without affecting the service equality. The
adaptive CS is to rely mainly on the information of some smart
objects and adapt the CS measurement conditions for the rest
of smart objects.
2) Frequency Selection for Static Environment: The static
environment may result in the information leakage when the
CS is applied to physical layer security model, thus a physical
layer security model based on CS and frequency in IoT
was proposed in [88]. The circulant matrix was exploited to
play a role of the measurement matrix for high efficiency,
as indicated in [114], and a binary resilient function was
utilized for strong security. To cope with the static application
scenario, the authors put the frequency-selective feature of the
wireless channel [89] into use to increase the entropy of the
measured channel and accelerate the rate of generating keys
from physical layer.
3) Chaotic CS for Internet of Multimedia Things: The
multimedia IoT [147] becomes pervasive with the era of
multimedia data and social networks. It faces two challenges
including low-cost sampling and confidentiality preservation.
Accordingly, a mechanism presented in [90] can overcome
these two challenges based on chaotic CS. The encryption
algorithm is comprised by several key steps as follows.
• Sampling multiple images based on the measurement
matrix generated by chaos,
yi= Axi. (36)
• Rearrange the multiple measurements yi into a master
image ymaster.
• Permute the master image ymaster to obtain y′master based
on Arnold transform.
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• Diffuse the permuted result y′master to obtain the final
result y′′master.
Observing the above steps can find that the encryption is
allowed to perform batch image processing, catering to the
multimedia big data. Meanwhile, the encryption is with the
architecture of two-layer, i.e., chaotic measurement matrix
and permutation-diffusion, thus the confidentiality can be
preserved well.
4) Secure Interaction with Cloud: When the IoT data are
straightforwardly placed at the cloud server, the privacy will be
exposed. A secure interaction between IoT and the cloud based
on CS was investigated in [91]. The raw data are acquired
by random compressed encryption and then uploaded to the
cloud server. Because the random compressed encryption is
a kind of multiplicative coefficient perturbation, the accessor
can calculate some statistical values over encrypted domain
without performing the decryption to obtain the raw data,
which brings great query convenience. This kind of encryp-
tion brings two additional advantages including statistical
decryption and decryption on demand. In addition to efficient
statistics computation, this encryption supports secure data
insertion and accurate raw decryption in cloud-enabled IoT
scenarios.
5) Compressed Detection: To directly detect the com-
pressive measurements without reconstruction is a promising
signal processing application, which has been investigated in
many references [148]–[152]. In particular, there exist some
works focusing on secrecy guarantees [85], [86]. In [85],
collaborative compressed detection is performed at distributed
nodes by elaborately designing measurement matrices. On
one hand, to deceive Eve, some artificial noise is injected
in cooperated trustworthy nodes to help the fusion centre.
On the other hand, some measurement matrices optimized
with the injection of artificial noise ensure the maximized
detection performance of the network without compromising
the secrecy. The collaborative compressed detection [85] was
extended to the work [86] from two aspects. One aspect is that
the performance loss caused by the compression with a single
sensor can be compensated and the other is to characterize the
trade-off between dimensionality reduction and the achievable
performance. Cognitive radio networks [153]–[155] are chosen
for experiment test to verify theoretical findings.
D. Other Wireless Communication Scenarios
1) Crowdsensing: The strength of low-complexity data
acquisition makes CS a promising tool for crowdsensing
systems with high burden on each participant [156], [157],
in which privacy issues are missing. Privacy issues based on
CS in crowdsensing were discussed in [92]–[94]. In mobile
crowdsensing, large-scale received signal strength maps of-
ten expose participants’ sensitivity information, therefore a
privacy-preserving scheme was projected by Wu et al. [92]. To
maximize the geographic map coverage while protecting the
participants’ trace privacy, the goal of generating a received
signal strength map can boils down to an objective function⋃l′
i=1
=∗i = arg max=i⊆℘i,∀i
⋃l′
i=1
=i,
s.t. PE (=i) ≥ C¯ or PE (=i) = 0, (37)
in which l′ reflects the participant number, =i represents
the trace of road segments of participant i, and ℘i is the
reported road segments of participant i. PE (·) indicates the
privacy exposure function that reflects the minimum number
of connections between two road segments. There are several
steps to realize the objective function. First, one can sample
the values of the received signal strength with CS so as to
remove the concrete and temporal location information in
every road segment. Then, after choosing some road segments,
each participant deliveries a third party the sampled data. Then
the third party removes more road segments for better privacy
protection. Finally, an expected map is generated in the central
server.
The work [93] was aimed at the data loss with a trajectory
because of hardware and energy constraints and proposed a
privacy-assured CS to collectively optimize the user privacy
protection and the data recovery accuracy in crowdsensing.
To tackle the privacy issue, a vector perturbation method was
established to perturb a user’s trajectory with other trajectories
and therefore attain a privacy-preserving CS. Specifically,
harnessing the vector perturbation method encrypts each us-
er’s incomplete location data. Then, the encrypted data are
transmitted to the crowdsensing server, which reconstructs the
encrypted data for all users straightforwardly without need of
decrypting the data. At last, the reconstructed data are sent to
each user who decrypts the data to obtain the trajectory of his
own with the inverse vector perturbation. The user’s privacy
can be preserved, since the data keep the encrypted form while
not affecting the CS reconstruction performance. The work
[94] has a similar idea to [93], i.e., a privacy-preserving CS
protocol without comprising its performance. The perturbed
CS in [94] embeds the cryptographic feature in CS, which
saves the sensor energy and is secure against chosen-plaintext
attack.
2) Smart Grid: In smart grid, the data privacy is a critical
concern due to the consumer information that smart meters
collect is often sensitive [158]–[161]. Gao et al. applied the
CS to smart grid for secure data transmission [95], whose
basic idea is to construct a secret measurement matrix for
simultaneous encryption, sampling, and compression. It bears
an analogy to the previous works like [52], whereas there is
a novel data preprocessing step, which is simply summarized
as follows.
• At time t, an access point acquires N readings
Rread,t =
(
Rread,t1 , · · · , Rread,tN
)
from N smart meters.
• At time t + 1, the access point calculates the difference
vector
Rread,t+1 −Rread,t =(
Rread,t+11 −Rread,t1 , · · · , Rread,t+1N −Rread,tN
)
.
The above data processing is ingenious, because, in gen-
eral, only a small number of readings will change between
adjoining moment and the difference vector is sparse. To keep
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TABLE IV
PERFORMANCE FOR DIFFERENT SECURITY MODELS.
Security Model Performance
CS-Based Secrecy [68] Build up a secure wireless wiretap channel by leveraging the channel asymmetry
Secrecy Capacity [69] Quantitatively investigate the lower and upper bounds of the secrecy capacity
The Secrecy Based on Distributed CS [126] Design an amplify-forward scheme to cater the distribute nature of wireless sensor network
The Secrecy Based on MIMO Precoding [71] Simultaneously maximize the secrecy and the signal-to-noise ratio
The Secrecy Based on Circulant Matrix [72] Guarantee the wireless indistinguishability security with some conditions
Multicarrier System [73]–[75] Induce artificial noise/channel randomization/particular measurement matrix for the security
Cooperative Networks [76] Own the superiority of energy harvesting and high secrecy capacity
Establishing Secure Measurement Matrix [77], [78] Design measurement matrix with reciprocal quantization/channel measurements
Integrity-Protected CS [79] AES for the encryption of measurements and hash algorithm for integrity checking
Capturing Medical Data [80] Capture data firstly and then encrypt them
Data Gathering [81]–[84] Combine pseudorandom permutations and symmetric/additively homomorphic encryption
Compressed Detection [85], [86] Perform collaborative compressed detection at distributed nodes
Adaptive CS for Smart Objects [87] Utilize the information of smart objects to adapt the CS measurement condition
Frequency Selection for Static Environment [88], [89] Enlarge the entropy of measured channel and accelerate the rate of generating keys
Chaotic CS for Internet of Multimedia Things [90] Realize low-cost sampling and confidentiality preservation
Secure Interaction with Cloud [91] Random compressed encryption for the raw data
Crowdsensing [92]–[94] Maximize the geographic map coverage and protect the participants’ trace privacy
Smart Grid [95]–[97] Construct a secret measurement matrix for joint encryption, sampling, and compression
Wireless Body Area Networks [98]–[100] Exploit chaotic CS for energy saving and data security
a long delay off over fading channels [162], multi-antenna
access point was suggested to improve the reliability [163].
At the same time, the security can be enhanced by frequently
updating keys and the physical layer security is achievable. In
addition, for wireless energy auditing networks, metering data
fidelity and secrecy are simultaneously ensure based on CS
[96], [97], which still make full use of the advantage of CS
with joint compression and encryption.
3) Wireless Body Area Networks: It consists of tiny sen-
sor nodes deployed around human body [164]–[166], which
involve some problems including the battery energy, storage,
communication, privacy, etc. In the case of privacy, the CS-
based monitoring was studied in [98]–[100]. In [98], chaotic
CS was designed to tackle two crucial problems including
energy saving and data security. The sampling equation based
on chaotic CS is
y =β1Ax + β2Amask, (38)
where Amask is mask matrix, and β1, β2 are the adjustment
parameters. The function of the mask matrix is to enhance the
security by masking the compressive measurements. Adjusting
the parameters can make the encrypted data reach a uniform
distribution approximately. The sampling equation can be
reformulated as
y′ =
y − β2Am
β1
= Ax, (39)
which indicates that the original measurements y are further
encrypted into y′ with three keys Amask, β1, and β2. The
chaotic CS behaves that the sampling process is controlled by
a chaotic system. In other words, given the initial values and
parameters, the chaotic system can generate a series of pseudo-
random values, which is mapped into the measurement matrix
A and mask matrix Amask according to some mapping rule.
As a result, the whole sampling process can be manipulated by
the chaotic system’s initial values and parameters as the keys,
which bring great convenience for key sharing. Furthermore,
the sensitivity of the initial value of chaotic system can furnish
strong security.
Following the encryption framework in [77], the reference
[99] exploited the CS for electrocardiography. They have
consistent results of the physical layer security and the energy
consumption, although facing different application scenarios.
However, they did not consider long-range consecutive health
monitoring. In order for this, Nia et al. quantified some re-
quirements with eight biomedical sensors including heart rate,
body temperature, accelerometer, blood glucose, electrocardio-
gram, electroencephalogram, etc. and systematically analysed
the energy and storage requirements [100]. On account of this,
the authors proposed the corresponding solutions, one of which
is to cut down the consumption for data transmission, storage,
and encryption. However, the encryption is not designed in the
CS but beyond the sampling, i.e., encrypting the measurements
with the existing classic encryption schemes, similar to [79],
[80].
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
We have provided a comprehensive survey for the state-
of-the-art involved in the security aspects of CS and applica-
tions of wireless communications. Aiming at how to design
secure CS, we have reviewed different CSC schemes through
investigating different types of measurement matrix. Subse-
quently, aiming at classifying extensive applications of CS,
various kinds of secure communication schemes for different
communication scenarios are examined. A summary result is
listed in Table IV for an overall understanding, in which each
security model based on CS has the corresponding particular
performance. Moreover, a statistical result for the number
of works is shown in Fig. 5, in which the horizontal axis
represents the year from 2006 to now and the vertical axis
stands for the number of references in terms of the security
aspects of CS and the applications of CS in secure wireless
communications. It can be observed from Fig. 5 that secure
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wireless communications based on CS is an increasingly hot
research area, especially in recent years.
As can be seen from this survey, there has been substantial
progress on the theoretical research of secure wireless com-
munications based on CS, but the application performance in
practical scenarios still needs to be further investigated. The
benefits that the CS can bring to wireless communications are
apparent. The complexity can be reduced and the reliability
can be improved. It can be easily incorporated into the
current software systems and the security can be guaranteed.
Thus, it has great potential in practical applications and is
expected to be able to work in the design of future wireless
communications. However, several critical techniques remain
to be developed before put in use:
• Developing adaptive sampling rate techniques, since the
sparsity of the signal to be processed is often unknown
and the bandwidth of the signal is not constant in time-
varying wireless environments;
• Constructing appropriate sparsity bases, which can well
match with the present variable signals in compressive
detection/estimation;
• Building up low-cost measurement matrix generation
techniques, because random measurement matrices re-
quire high-complexity realizations and occupy large
memory;
• Designing low-complexity reconstruction algorithms as
high-complexity reconstruction is not suitable for real-
time communication processing;
• Exploiting robust CS mechanisms against unforeseen
circumstances such as noise, channel uncertainty, channel
correlation, synchronization errors, multicarrier distor-
tion, etc.;
• Establishing hardware platforms for CS realization com-
patible with practical wireless communication environ-
ments.
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